The Double Auction Market
Institutions, Theories, And Evidence
Contributors
By Daniel Friedman
Edited by John Rust
Also available from:
- On Sale
- Mar 21, 1993
- Page Count
- 464 pages
- Publisher
- Avalon Publishing
- ISBN-13
- 9780201624595
This collection of papers focuses on markets organized as double auctions (DA). In a double auction, both buyers and sellers can actively present bids (offers to buy) and asks (offers to sell) for standardized units of well-defined commodities and securities. A classic example of a DA market (known by practitioners as an open outcry market) is the commodity trading pit at the Chicago Board of Trade. A related process is a call market, which is used to determine opening prices on the New York Stock Exchange. Already the predominant trading institution for financial and commodities markets, the double auction has many variants and is evolving rapidly in the present era of advancing computer technology and regulatory reform. DA markets are of theoretical as well as practical interest in view of the central role these institutions play in allocating resources. Although the DA has been studied intensively in the laboratory, and practitioners have considerable experience in the field, only recently have tools started to become available to provide the underpinning of a behavioral theory of DA markets.
Genre:
Series:
Formats and Prices
Price
$59.00Format
Format:
Trade Paperback $59.00Newsletter Signup
By clicking ‘Sign Up,’ I acknowledge that I have read and agree to Hachette Book Group’s Privacy Policy and Terms of Use